

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R. K. NEHRU

(India)

64-20215

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. R. M. TAIT
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. KLUSAK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN
Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R. K. NEHRU
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. M. IONESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSkjOLD
Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. L. I. MENDELYEVICH
Mr. M. V. ANTIASOV
Mr. I. M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. S. El FATATRI

United Kingdom:

Mr. Peter THOMAS
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. R. C. BEETHAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America: Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the Mr. D. PROTITCH
Secretary-General:

Deputy Special Representative Mr. W. EPSTEIN
of the Secretary-General:

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the 211th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): In his message of 21 January (ENDC/120) President Johnson presented to this Conference a series of specific proposals for collateral measures of disarmament. Those proposals were designed as practical, meaningful ways of arresting the arms race and reducing the dangers present in today's world. They were designed to be readily possible of agreement, and to bring about real progress now towards the goals of this Conference. Among those proposals is one of the most significant and far-reaching measures before this Conference, short of general and complete disarmament. I refer to the verified freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles, the exploration of which President Johnson urged upon this Committee.

Today I should like to elaborate on that proposal by presenting some illustrative material on the nature of the verification that would be required in its support. The procedures which I shall outline will, of course, require further detailed discussion and negotiation within this Conference. Also, it is not intended that this presentation should cover all aspects of the verification of the freeze. For example, I shall not discuss the problem of verifying the freeze of strategic anti-ballistic-missile systems, which we have previously indicated would be included along with offensive delivery vehicles (ENDC/PV.197, p.6). However, I believe that the material which I present today will provide a basis for a sound understanding of the nature of the verification system we contemplate and for initiating explorations of the freeze proposal.

I believe that it is appropriate to set forth this material on verification of a freeze in some detail at this time for two reasons. First, questions raised by other delegations in past discussions, especially by the delegation of the Soviet Union, indicate that there is some misunderstanding of the nature and extent of the verification measures we propose. Second, we wish to make this information available for study by the other delegations and their Governments while the Conference is in recess.

As regards the matters to be negotiated, it might be helpful to begin by noting those elements which would be necessary for effective operation of the verification arrangements. It will, of course, be necessary to agree on the armaments affected by the agreement. Each party would submit a list indicating which of its armaments it considered to be affected. It will also be necessary to agree on the non-strategic

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military and non-military vehicles possessing weight, thrust and range characteristics falling within the categories included in the agreement. Any differences of opinion would be negotiated.

Agreement would also have to be reached on the specified major sub-assemblies affected by the agreement. The United States believes that the following sub-assemblies should be specified: (a) for ballistic missiles -- liquid rocket engines and tankage, solid rocket motors, stage assemblies and mobile launchers; (b) for cruise-type missiles and aircraft -- fuselages.

Affected armaments and specified major sub-assemblies could continue to be produced on the basis of a one-for-one replacement by an armament or sub-assembly of the same type. Each party would submit a list indicating which of its armaments it considered to be of the same type and describing each model within a type by gross external characteristics, such as major dimensions and gross configuration. Any differences of opinion would be negotiated. This procedure would assist in precluding the possibility of introducing more advanced weapons through replacement production. The parties would seek to agree on acceptable replacements for the armaments and specified major sub-assemblies no longer in production.

It would be necessary also to agree on annual production quotas for each of the allowed armament and specified sub-assembly replacements. This would be done by deciding upon (a) an annual number of permitted confidence and training firings for each type of missile; (b) an estimate of the number of vehicles lost annually by accident for each type of vehicle; (c) the anticipated number of replacements due to natural attrition -- such as end of maintenance life or malfunction -- for each type of armament and specified sub-assembly.

We believe that there should be an arrangement under which all quotas would be reviewed at the request of any party. Parties would have to agree, of course, upon arrangements relating to verification, such as the annual quotas of inspections and the rights of inspectors.

As regards declarations, each party would describe and give the location of the facilities involved, or those which had been involved, in producing the affected armaments and the specified major sub-assemblies and retaining a capability to produce those items. The parties would identify those facilities intended for use for allowed replacement production and those to be converted to peaceful uses or closed down.

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The facilities to be declared would include the following:

(a) Facilities performing final production-line assembly of the armaments or vehicles in the affected categories. However, this would not be interpreted to include military installations not engaged in manufacturing at which partial assembly or disassembly might be performed for operational or maintenance purposes.

(b) Facilities producing the specified major sub-assemblies --- that is, those producing or testing ballistic-missile liquid-fuelled engines or solid-fuelled motors; those fabricating and assembling tankage, ballistic-missile stage assemblies and mobile launchers; and those manufacturing aircraft or cruise-type missile fuselages.

(c) Facilities manufacturing ship hulls used for launching sea-based missiles.

Armament production quotas would also be declared. Thus the yearly amount and type of each affected armament and/or specified major sub-assembly to be produced at each of the facilities performing allowed replacement production would be declared. Each party would be responsible for scheduling its production in conformance with its annual quota.

In addition, each party would describe and give the location of those facilities involved, or which had been involved, in space or aircraft programmes which retain a capability to produce affected armaments or specified major sub-assemblies. Those facilities would be allowed to continue to perform their declared allowed activities, and the anticipated production of specified sub-assemblies of aircraft and space boosters would be declared.

Parties to the agreement would declare all installations to be used for space vehicle launchings and all sites to be used for allowed firings of vehicles affected by the agreement. No other operational launching sites would have to be declared.

The aforementioned disclosures would be made after any agreement had been concluded but before implementation had begun. During the course of the agreement the following additional disclosures would have to be made. The parties would declare any facilities which were converted or constructed after the initial declarations on which could be used to produce or assemble the affected armaments and specified sub-assemblies. The declarations would be made at the time conversion or construction was begun.

The parties would, in addition, give notice of any armaments and specified sub-assemblies to be destroyed because of natural attrition. They would supply the date and location of the destruction, with sufficient advance notice to permit observers to be present at the destruction site. In the event of accidental destruction, appropriate evidence would have to be supplied as a basis for replacement production. If no

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replacement production were required, no notice or evidence would be required. To the extent that launcher replacement is permitted, appropriate declarations relating to such replacement would be required.

Parties would also have to give appropriate notice of the planned production of space boosters, including the anticipated utilization of each booster in their space programmes, to provide reasonable assurance against stockpiling. That would not mean, however, that the nature of the payload would have to be announced.

As regards all space launchings and allowed missile firings, the parties would have to give advance notice of the time and launching-site location. Information to be provided would include identification of the booster designated for each space launching and the type of missile for each allowed firing. Notification would have to be given in sufficient time to permit on-site observation of the vehicle prior to launching. In the case of missiles launched from submarines or ships, notification would have to be sufficiently in advance to permit observation ships to be in the vicinity.

With respect to the question of scheduling, each party would be responsible for maintaining a balance between the accidental destruction or expenditure of armaments, including allowed missile firings, and the scheduled annual production. That is to say, for each year and for each type of armament the number of armaments produced would not be permitted to exceed the number destroyed or lost through firings or accidents; a similar balance would be required for each specified major sub-assembly and for space boosters.

Turning now to the verification procedures, we believe that inspectors should conduct an initial check of declared facilities no longer producing the affected armaments and specified sub-assemblies to ensure that they had been dismantled, closed or converted to other production activities. This initial inspection probably could be accomplished at each facility in several days and would include an examination of all manufacturing areas of the facility. Since many months are required to establish the production lines of relevant armaments and the specified sub-assemblies and to attain a reasonable production rate, occasional unannounced checks of these facilities subsequent to the initial inspection would be adequate.

As regards declared operating production facilities, inspectors would monitor the allowed production of armaments and specified major sub-assemblies at the declared facilities. They would verify that only agreed numbers and configurations of affected items were being produced for purposes of replacement or allowed missile firings. The allowed production of aircraft and space boosters falling within the affected categories would also be monitored to ensure that only declared permitted activities were taking place

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The inspectors would conduct an initial check of declared operating production facilities. With the assistance of liaison personnel from the inspected country, they would determine the layout and organization of the facilities to be inspected. The inspectors would develop inspection procedures most suited to each facility. Suitable production schedules would be provided by the inspected party.

After this initial check, the inspectors would have access to manufacturing, testing and assembly areas involved in the production cycle of the declared facilities. Within these areas the inspected country would be required to expose equipment and processes only in so far as this was necessary to permit the inspectors to confirm the number and configuration of affected items produced. I should point out that in monitoring the production of these items the inspectors would check their external characteristics by visual observation and would not require detailed information such as engineering drawings.

The destruction of armaments to be replaced would be performed by the party owning the armaments. Inspectors at the designated depots would verify by visual observation that the armaments and specified major sub-assemblies submitted for destruction were of the declared types, and would record the numbers and types destroyed.

Observers would witness announced missile and space firings to ensure that the proper types and numbers of vehicles were being launched. It is our view that pre-launch inspection should consist of visual observation of the gross characteristics of the vehicles being launched.

Accidental losses or destruction of vehicles and launchers would normally be verified by on-site inspection. If physical difficulties prevented such inspection, provision would have to be made for confirmation of such losses in a manner satisfactory to all parties. In the event that one of the parties could demonstrate to the satisfaction of the other parties that its accident rate had exceeded that allowed in any annual period, it could produce agreed replacement items during the succeeding year to replace those accidentally expended. Should no replacement allowance be required, no inspection to confirm accidental loss or destruction would be required.

There would be appropriate inspection procedures relating to limitations on launchers, for the purpose of ensuring that violations of any agreed limitations on launcher replacement, construction and improvement were not taking place. The United States, however, does not feel that either declarations or inspection of existing inventories of armaments or of the number and deployment of existing launchers would be required as part of a strategic nuclear vehicle freeze agreement. This would not

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preclude the inspection of existing launchers or launching sites for possible unauthorized launcher construction and improvement activities as provided for in the following discussion.

With regard to any undeclared production facilities or unauthorized launcher construction and improvement activities, an inspection system that would include a specified number of inspections per year at times and places selected by the inspecting power would be required to provide reasonable assurance against possible prohibited activities and to deter possible violations. The inspectors should, of course, have at their disposal appropriate transportation to ensure that inspections could be conducted without delay.

Within the agreed quotas, inspections would have to be initiated and carried out by parties other than the party whose territory was to be inspected. This is sometimes referred to as "adversary inspection". For example, the United States would be allowed to initiate and carry out inspections in the territory of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, would be allowed to initiate and carry out inspections in the United States; suitable arrangements would be made for inspection in the territories of other parties which might participate.

It would not be necessary to disclose any evidence to justify the selection of the site to be inspected. However, mutually-acceptable arrangements should and, we believe, could be developed to protect the host country against abuse of inspection privileges for the purpose of observing sensitive activities or facilities which did not legitimately fall within the scope of objects subject to inspection. In particular, while the inspected country would endeavour to provide the other parties with assurance that undeclared production and unauthorized launcher construction and improvement were not taking place, it would be permitted to institute appropriate safeguards to ensure the security of sensitive installations.

The United States has already indicated that a treaty embodying the provisions of a freeze should contain a withdrawal clause similar to that contained in the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). I know the Committee is familiar with the text of that Treaty, and I know the Soviet representative is familiar with its history and development. The freeze agreement should also contain a provision that a conference would be held, periodically or at the call of any party, to consider whether the treaty should be continued or modified. It should be further provided that after such a conference any party could consider whether to exercise its right under the

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withdrawal clause on the basis of the results of the conference. That withdrawal clause could be used to prevent the safeguards designed to ensure the security of sensitive installations from being used to evade the provisions of the agreement. If, in its judgement, a party felt that a safeguard was being used to evade the provisions of the agreement, this could be a reason for that party to invoke the withdrawal procedures of the agreement.

The United States believes that an inspection arrangement of the type I have just described, together with such additional procedures as might be required, would be much less intrusive than that required for general and complete disarmament and yet sufficient to afford the necessary level of assurance of compliance with the proposed freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles.

I have noted both the extent and the limits of the verification requirements. Some degree of technical complexity cannot be avoided; but it is necessary not only to ensure that a freeze can be achieved with security and confidence of compliance, but also to ensure that verification requirements are not excessive. The procedures I have sketched would, as I have said, require further detailed discussion and negotiation. They have been put forth as a basis for exploration in the same spirit as that in which my Government has already proposed the basic principles of the freeze. It is my sincere hope that other delegations will examine this proposal further. That hope is particularly directed at those delegations whose countries also possess such vehicles and therefore also bear particularly heavy responsibility for the continued security of the human race.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I propose now, with your permission, to speak in my capacity as representative of India.

We have listened with great interest to the important and constructive statement which Mr. Timberlake, the United States representative, has just made. We shall, of course, study the statement carefully and perhaps make some comments on it at some later stage. The United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles is an important collateral measure which we have discussed at several meetings. It is again on our agenda today; but I should like to deviate slightly from the agenda. Our procedures, as we all know, are flexible, and such deviations are permitted.

I propose today, on behalf of my delegation, to speak briefly on a number of measures, or on collateral measures as a whole. I think there is some advantage in following such a course. We have discussed many of these measures very fully at

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previous meetings. The discussions have been of great value and have given us a clear idea of the positions of each side. Now our session is drawing to a close, and there is not much time left for further discussions in depth. Unless there is some change in our programme, there will be only two or three more meetings on collateral measures. It seems desirable, therefore, instead of going over old arguments, to concentrate more fully on the search for solutions or agreements, however limited, so that our report to the General Assembly may show some positive results.

I am sure we are all agreed that we must show some results, or greater progress in our work. It would be a disappointment for us all if our work, which has been going on for six months, showed no results. The Assembly also would be disappointed, as it expects us to make some contribution to a further improvement in the international atmosphere. The existing improvement was brought about by last year's agreements and some unilateral decisions of the great Powers based on the policy of mutual example. Both the agreements and the unilateral decisions show a spirit of compromise and mutual accommodation which has brought about a change in the atmosphere.

It is true, of course, that none of those agreements, which have been welcomed so widely, was reached in our Committee. However, I think I am right in saying that both the agreements and the unilateral decisions owe a good deal to our work. Constructive suggestions were made in our Committee which may have helped the great Powers to take other positive steps. Thus suggestions which aim at closing the gap between the two sides on specific measures seem important to us. Any suggestion that we might make must of course take full account of the higher interests of the world community. This is the kind of solution we might aim at if agreements cannot be reached during our present session. The suggestions must of course be recorded in some appropriate way which would suit the convenience of the Assembly. The Assembly and the governments concerned may find them of some value; and at some early date, if not immediately, they may help to pave the way for further agreements or unilateral decisions.

Bearing those considerations in mind, I propose today, on behalf of my delegation, to consider briefly the task which was allotted to us, the area of agreement which we have achieved, and the possibilities of enlarging the area, either now or at some later date. I propose also to state the views of my delegation on some of the measures which we have been discussing.

(The Chairman, India)

The three resolutions of the General Assembly which form the basis of our work relate both to disarmament and to collateral measures. We are not concerned today with general and complete disarmament. However, I should like to say that, in spite of the obstacles that have arisen, our work has not, in our view, been completely fruitless. The proposal for setting up a working group on the key problem of disarmament, namely the elimination of missiles, has been generally accepted. The terms of reference are, of course, in dispute, but the special concerns of each side have been clarified in the course of our discussions. The non-aligned countries have made some suggestions which take full account of those concerns. They have offered their assistance to the co-Chairmen in framing the terms of reference. Although their suggestions have not yet been accepted, I have no doubt that in due course they will help us to advance along the road to an agreement.

As far as collateral measures are concerned, we have been asked, first, to make efforts to seek agreements on measures which could serve to reduce international tension, and so on (A/RES/1908(XVIII); ENDC/139); secondly, to study urgently and to report upon the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (A/PES/1909(XVIII); *ibid.*); and, thirdly, to continue, with a sense of urgency, our negotiations for the extension of the test-ban Treaty to underground tests (A/RES/1910(XVIII); *ibid.*). We have had a brief but useful discussion on the last two collateral measures. On the more general collateral measures proposed by the United States and Soviet delegations (ENDC/120, 123), much lengthier discussions have taken place.

An important feature of some of these measures is that they deal primarily with the question of nuclear disarmament. This is a matter of deep concern to the world as a whole. The arms race, and more particularly the accumulation of nuclear arms, is a growing threat to humanity. Some of the collateral measures which have been proposed by the United States and Soviet delegations aim at reducing the immediate threat. We welcome the initiatives which have been taken by the two delegations on that question. No agreement is yet in sight, but the non-aligned countries have made some suggestions, and we have no doubt that those suggestions will lead to some results. It is about those suggestions that I should like to speak briefly today.

First, there is the proposal for convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The brief discussion which has taken place in our Committee shows that the vital importance of eliminating

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the risk of nuclear war is fully recognized by all delegations. There is no difference of opinion on this, or on reaching the necessary agreements for eliminating such a risk. Opinions differ, however, on the desirability of signing a convention, or the effectiveness of such a convention, before other agreements have been reached. I should like to explain briefly India's position on this question.

Although we are making rapid progress in the field of nuclear science and technology, the Government of India has taken a firm decision that in no circumstances will our nuclear capabilities be used for non-peaceful purposes. We have no intention of producing or acquiring nuclear weapons, irrespective of any action that any other country may take. We have always been opposed, and we continue to be totally opposed, to the use of nuclear weapons. We have supported the Ethiopian resolution on the convening of a conference for the purpose of signing a convention. We agree that the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of the United Nations Charter and is contrary to the laws of humanity. We also agree that any such use is a crime against mankind and against civilization. Those are the views which we have expressed in our reply to the Secretary-General (DC/201/Add.2, p.32), who made some inquiries from Member States. However, we have also expressed the view that if a convention is to be effective it will require the active support of all States, and more particularly of States which possess such weapons. Without the participation of all States the proposed convention would not, in our view, be effective.

Our Western colleagues have pointed out that the proposed convention might have the effect of undermining security. Suggestions have also been made that, in the absence of means of control or measures of disarmament, such a convention might not be useful at the present time. Our suggestion is that, if a conference were held on the basis of the Ethiopian resolution, all such objections could be considered in that conference.

Another collateral measure on which we have been asked to continue our negotiations is the extension of the test ban-Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to underground tests. Our position on this question is well known. We have always attached the highest importance to the banning of nuclear tests. Ten years ago the late Prime Minister of India urged the conclusion of a standstill agreement on nuclear tests of all kinds. Thereafter, year after year, the Indian delegation has brought this question before the United Nations. We have welcomed the partial test ban, which has helped to reduce the radiation hazards and brought about a break in the ice of the cold war.

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However, underground tests have not yet been banned; the danger of radioactive fall-out has not been completely eliminated; and the tests which continue, for the development of new weapons or the improvement of old weapons, are a constant threat to stability and peace.

I should like to make three suggestions in this regard on behalf of my delegation.

First, it is imperative that the partial test ban should be subscribed to by all States, and we hope that the nuclear Powers will continue their efforts to make the ban universal.

Secondly, while we welcome the fact that the nuclear Powers have expressed their determination to continue their negotiations for the banning of all tests, we regret that their negotiations have not yet led to any results. We realize that there are differences among the nuclear Powers on the question of the identification of underground tests. However, in the interest of halting the arms race, reducing international tension and eliminating the adverse effects of radiation by seepage or other means, with the resultant risk of possible repudiation of the partial test ban Treaty, we consider it imperative that all underground tests should be discontinued immediately, either by unilateral decisions based on the policy of mutual example or in some other appropriate way, while negotiations are going on for reconciling the differences between the nuclear Powers.

Thirdly, the nuclear Powers might also take steps towards the conclusion of a formal treaty on the cessation of underground tests by stages. Thus another partial treaty might be entered into for cessation of tests above a limited threshold. For establishing such a threshold, or considering the possibility of the establishment of such a threshold, it might be necessary for the nuclear Powers to exchange scientific and other data. The threshold could be lowered subsequently as a result of the continuing exchange of scientific and other data and other negotiations.

As regards the remaining collateral measures proposed at the commencement of our last session, some have been discussed more or less fully, while on others the discussion is still going on. On some of those measures my delegation has made certain suggestions or expressed its views. Our purpose has been to reconcile differences while taking full account of the higher interests of the world community. I shall not repeat our views and the suggestions we have made, except on the important proposal for the conclusion of a non-dissemination agreement (ENDC/123). For purposes of the record, however, I might point out that our suggestions on such measures as

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cuts in military budgets, the verified freeze of strategic vehicles and the production of fissionable material for weapon use, and the destruction of bombers, are contained in the statement which we made at the 187th meeting. We made other suggestions at earlier meetings, but I am confining myself now to our latest statement. On some of those measures discussions are still going on, and, if necessary, we may modify or add to our previous suggestions.

I should now like to deal in greater detail with the proposal for a non-dissemination agreement. In our view, that is a proposal of major importance.

First, it is a joint proposal in the sense that both the nuclear Powers have shown their concern over that matter and have expressed their readiness to conclude an agreement which will prevent the dissemination or proliferation of nuclear weapons. We fully share their concern, as the number of countries with nuclear capabilities is steadily expanding; there is grave danger that nuclear weapons will spread to other countries.

Secondly, a non-dissemination agreement is, in our view, the logical next step to the Moscow Treaty. Although there are no specific provisions to that effect in the Treaty, we consider that by implication the non-nuclear States which have signed the Treaty have renounced the dubious ambition of becoming nuclear Powers. The Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)) also, in spite of some of its provisions which are not completely clear, has imposed on the nuclear Powers the obligation to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting information, and so forth, and a corresponding obligation on non-nuclear States not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons. Many developments have taken place since the Irish resolution was adopted, and it is clear to us that relinquishment of control should be interpreted today in the broadest possible sense so as to preclude the transfer of nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear Power, either under joint or under individual control.

Thirdly, all such questions should, in our view, be settled by negotiations. However, what seems to be coming in the way of negotiations, according to our East European colleagues, is the Western proposal for setting up a multilateral nuclear force. The Western view seems to be that the proposed force will not involve any relinquishment of control of nuclear weapons, and that the Soviet missile threat to certain countries of Western Europe has made the setting-up of such a force necessary, as the countries concerned wish to participate in their own defence. The

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East European view seems to be that the proposed force will not only lead to the dissemination of nuclear weapons but will also create a new threat to the countries of Eastern Europe. According to our East European colleagues, the setting-up of such a force will lead to a grave setback in the international situation.

I have stated, very briefly, the views of the two sides as we understand them. We have expressed our own views on non-dissemination at the 174th and 187th meetings. The crux of the matter seems to be that, so long as certain Powers continue to possess nuclear weapons and no serious effort is made to bring about nuclear disarmament, there will always be some danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The danger arises from the fact that other countries may be encouraged to demand nuclear weapons or to develop their own nuclear armouries. Therefore, in our view, an immediate agreement on non-dissemination must be accompanied by a more serious effort to bring about the total elimination of nuclear armaments, and general and complete disarmament.

At the 207th meeting the representative of the United Arab Republic made an important statement on that subject. Basically, his views are the same as ours, though we differ on one or two points. We have welcomed the declaration of the Organization of African Unity on nuclear disarmament and non-dissemination. Many of the suggestions made in the declaration are in line with our own policy. On behalf of my delegation, I should like again to state our views on non-dissemination.

First, negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement on non-dissemination should be started without delay, as proposed by the United States delegation. We can see no objection to a joint declaration being made, as suggested by our United Arab Republic colleague (ENDC/PV.207, p.9); but, if that is likely to cause some delay, the more substantive negotiations could start even without any joint declaration.

Secondly, there should be a clear understanding or agreement that while negotiations are going on no change will be made by either side in any arrangements that may exist at present for the control, use, possession or transfer of nuclear weapons, or for training nationals of non-nuclear States in the use of such weapons, and that all existing arrangements will be frozen on each side. That, in our view, is a reasonable basis for negotiations on matters which have aroused strong reactions on one side or the other. How can one expect serious negotiations if, on questions relating to transfer or control of nuclear weapons which raise some fundamental issues, pre-emptive action by either side is taken in advance?

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Thirdly, the negotiations should be completed with the least possible delay. There is no reason why they should go on indefinitely. A target date might be agreed upon, if necessary. In the course of the negotiations, such threats or fears as may have led to a demand for some change in existing arrangements on one side or the other should also be fully examined. A serious effort should be made to remove or reduce the legitimate fears of each side.

Fourthly, the negotiations should lead as soon as possible to the conclusion of an agreement or international treaty, and all States should be invited to sign the treaty.

We think it necessary that some such steps be taken in the immediate future. It is possible, of course, that private discussions between the nuclear Powers are already going on. If so, we should welcome an early agreement so that the danger of proliferation may be removed and the improvement in the international atmosphere may not suffer a setback. It does not seem to us necessary for a technical body to be set up to examine the nature or characteristics of the multilateral nuclear force. As we all know, the questions at issue are not technical but political. However, that is a matter for the nuclear Powers to consider. They may take such action as may be necessary on matters of detail after the negotiations have started.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): I do not intend to speak at any length, but perhaps I might make just one or two remarks about some of the things we have heard this morning.

First of all, let me say that I listened with great respect to the statement that you, Mr. Chairman, have just made -- the respect that one always accords to views expressed by your delegation and your country, since the sincerity of the views expressed by representatives of India is always accepted by everybody. Perhaps you will acquit me of discourtesy if I do not reply in detail to the suggestions you have made. We shall certainly give full weight to those suggestions and shall be very happy to consider carefully the remarks you have made.

On 20 August my colleague Mr. Tahourdin set out (ENDC/PV.209, pp.11 et seq.) the views of Her Majesty's Government on the two matters to which you referred relating to a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the resolution (A/RES/1909 (XVIII); ENDC/139) concerning the convening of a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. At

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

that time Mr. Tahourdin emphasized the importance which Her Majesty's Government attaches to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and I should like to take this opportunity to re-emphasize the importance we attach to such an agreement. I hope I shall be forgiven if I do not repeat what Mr. Tahourdin said at that time; what he said represents what is still, in fact, the view of my Government.

On 23 July I spoke at some length (ENDC/PV.201, pp.21 et seq.) on the question of a non-dissemination agreement. I should like today to repeat what I said -- and to reiterate what you, Mr. Chairman, have said -- to the effect that this would be an important follow-up to the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) of a year ago. Her Majesty's Government feels that there are in fact no obstacles to the immediate signing of such an agreement.

The main reason for my intervention is to refer briefly to the important statement we have heard this morning from Mr. Timberlake, to which all delegations here, I believe, listened with considerable interest. It was a valuable amplification of the United States Government's views on how the United States proposal (ENDC/120) for a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles could be worked out in practice. It puts before us a more complete explanation than we have yet had of the system of verification which would be required in connexion with the freeze.

Inevitably this is a highly complex subject, and all delegations and all Governments represented here would wish to study it very carefully. Meanwhile perhaps I might say that I hope none of us will pronounce on it too hastily, without taking time to consider suggestions which are themselves so clearly the result of much careful consideration. However, I can say straight away that what Mr. Timberlake has put forward seems to us to provide important support for the proposals already submitted. What he has outlined seems to offer an effective system of verification in this field. Considered in a broader context, the proposals made by the United States this morning might provide us with a model which we could use when turning our attention to verification on a larger scale in relation to general and complete disarmament. It is not a matter on which one can form a judgement at first hearing, but I think we might all relate this thought to our later consideration of Mr. Timberlake's remarks.

Finally, in welcoming these United States proposals, I should like to say that once again, as with their recent paper (ENDC/134) on verification of a cut-off of production of fissionable material, the authors have clearly wished to reduce to a minimum the intrusiveness of the verification process. The proposals represent an effort, therefore, to meet the objection which has been advanced earlier against verification proposals: that excessive control would be required.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

That is really all I wish to say. I hope it is agreed that a freeze such as our United States colleagues have suggested would be of great benefit in making progress towards disarmament, and that we can now give our serious attention to detailed explanations, such as our United States colleague has given us here today, of what would be involved.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 211th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador R.K. Nehru, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, India and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 1 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.